purchased some form of value-added foodstuffs, many of which-like Borden's condensed milk, Pillsbury flour, or Heinz ketchup-were relatively new products. By the early 20th century, the food manufacturing industry had become one of the most important in the United States, and the company Heinz founded, H.J. Heinz, one of the largest in the world (p. 1).
A key element of Heinz's strategy was positioning its products to benefit from both emerging supply-side changes (e.g., technology, transportation, productivity advances, and so on) and demand-side changes (e.g., urbanization, increasing job opportunities, increasing incomes, and so on). 4 Interestingly, these are the same dynamics that Heinz leveraged to successfully expand from a national market to a global one from the late 20th to the early 21st century. This is not to say that Heinz's current strategy is a mirror image of its historical one: Modern developed markets have different dynamics from emerging ones. To mitigate the risk in this difference, Heinz's current CEO, Bill Johnson, derived an entrepreneurial growth strategy worthy of Henry Heinz himself, which was based on the following four elements: 1) products that are designed for local markets, 2) products that are efficiently available to customers (i.e., distribution management), 3) products that are appropriately priced (i.e., pricing emerging market products differently from the products of more mature markets), 5 and 4) establishing and continuously building brand equity. 6 Successful implementation of the above strategy produced impressive results. For example, in 2011 more than 20% of Heinz's revenue came from emerging markets (such as China, India, Russia, and so on) compared to less than 5% only a few years before (Johnson [2011] ), and as indicated in Heinz's 2012 Annual Report, the firm ranked first among all 225 companies across 47 industries in the 2011 American Customer Satisfaction Index (p. 4).
7
It was also the number one global producer of ketchup and the number two global producer of other sauces.
As Exhibit 1 illustrates, Heinz's strategy generated significant levels of profitability (e.g., average ROE of 42.4%) and powerful growth (e.g., cumulative growth of 41.4%). Heinz's performance does, however, exhibit some cause for concern: First, its ROE has declined every year following the 2009 high of 59% to 31% in 2012, which was the second-lowest return in the years profiled. Additionally, and as illustrated in Exhibit 2, Heinz's risk-adjusted margin declined to a period low in a pattern somewhat reminiscent of General Re's at the time of its acquisition. Therefore, the challenge at this point in the case is to conservatively estimate Heinz's value at the time of its acquisition and determine if the $72.50 per share price contained a reasonable margin of safety, and if so, why.
HEINZ VALUATION
There are four phases of modern Graham and Dodd valuation: assessing the reproduction value of a balance sheet to derive a more economically consistent
E X H I B I T 2 Risk-Adjusted Margin Comparison
Data source: Morningstar for Heinz, and Calandro [2009, p. 98] net asset value (NAV), estimating the perpetual value of sustainable earnings to derive an earnings power value (EPV), evaluating franchise value in cases where a firm's EPV is materially greater than its NAV, and estimating the value of growth. Beginning with NAV, our valuation of Heinz is illustrated in Exhibit 3.
Note (1A) of the exhibit simply adds back the allowance for doubtful accounts for trade receivables and other receivables. It is necessary to add this provision back for reproduction purposes because, "A new firm starting out is even more likely to get stuck by customers who for some reason or another do not pay their bills, so the cost of reproducing an existing firm's accounts receivables is probably more than the book amount. Many financial statements will specify how much has been deducted to arrive at this net figure.
That amount should be added back" Note (4A) discounts deferred tax liabilities at an assumed rate of 7% over an assumed duration of two years.
10 If this were a live valuation, tax accountants and/or attorneys could be consulted to validate these assumptions.
Notes (5A) to (8A) add operating leases, deferred pension losses, options, and warrants onto the balance sheet based on information found in the 2012 Heinz Form 10K.
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Subtracting the reproduction value of the assets ($14,464,827) from the reproduction value of the liabilities ($12,148,778) gives a net asset value (or NAV) of $7.2 per share.
12 As this value is driven by significant assumptions, such as our goodwill adjustment, it will be validated by an earnings power value (EPV).
Exhibit 4 illustrates our EPV for Heinz. By way of background, EPV is a perpetual value, based on a level of earnings that are expected to be sustainable into perpetuity. To derive this estimate for Heinz we multiplied their 2012 revenue (note (1E)) by their average operating margin of approximately 15% (note (2E)), which gave operating income of $1,724,064 (note (3E)).
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Note (4E) is an estimated options expense, which was derived by multiplying the given $0.02 per share dilution by the amount of Heinz's shares outstanding.
14 Note (5E) is the pension expense and note (6E) is depreciation and amortization.
15 With regard to depreciation, growth CAPEX is frequently deducted from it when estimating EPV; however, and as Exhibit 5 shows, Heinz's growth needs exceed an estimate of its maintenance CAPEX. In cases like this, depreciation and amortization can be added back, dollar-for-dollar, which gives an estimate akin to EBITDA (earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization), which is often used in private equity deal valuation.
16
Note (7) pertains to the interest income found on Heinz's income statement, 17 which is deducted from operating income because its capitalized value is the amount of cash on the balance sheet, which will be added to capitalized earnings to derive EPV, as shown below.
Pre One unique feature of Graham and Dodd valuation is the insight that can be derived from comparing NAV-to-EPV patterns (Calandro [2011b] ). Most of the time these two values will relatively reconcile; however, when EPV is materially greater than NAV it signals the existence of a possible franchise, which is a firm operating with a sustainable competitive advantage. The existence of a franchise must be validated through strategic analysis.
In the case of Heinz, its competitive advantage lies in three mutually reinforcing areas: 1) the formulas it uses to produce its popular line of products, 2) efficient marketing to establish and sustain brand equity (e.g., the Heinz commercials demonstrating the thickness, and thus quality, of its ketchup), and 3) management that has effectively recognized, and capitalized on, both demandand supply-side trends. 20 The profitability that has been generated from this strategy is significant (see Exhibit 1), but the size of the NAV-to-EPV spread (10 times) is very large, thus posing a considerable value realization risk. We will address this risk after concluding our valuation.
As noted above, EPV is a perpetual value based on sustainable (or nongrowth) earnings. To the extent growth will create value it must be valued separately, which is a significant advantage of Graham and Dodd valuation over more common forms of valuation (discounted cash f low, multiples, and comparables), which tend to blend the two values (nongrowth and growth). Such a blending tends to result in generally higher valuations, and thus deal prices, which have significantly contributed to deal failures in the past. 21 Our growth valuation of Heinz is illustrated in Exhibit 6.
The calculations for estimating growth in the exhibit are straightforward, 22 except for one: note (d) in the exhibit refers to Heinz's 10-year average ROE, which was used in lieu of its discount rate, estimated previously at 7%.
This substitution was made given the tremendous returns that Heinz's franchise has generated over the years, which resulted in a return on net asset value (or RNAV) of nearly 69% (note [c] ). Given such performance and its assumed continuance, it is logical to benchmark marginal growth against historical returns, which in this case led to a growth multiple of 1. 6 (note [e] deal equates to a growth-based margin of safety of 68% (= ($121.54 − $72.50)/$72.50), which is greater than Greenwald et al.'s [2001] margin of safety threshold of "about one-half, and not less than one-third" (p. 4). However, there is significant risk associated with this estimated margin: As noted above, the NAV-to-EPV spread in this case is very large and therefore prone to value realization risk. This risk is material, given the recent 50% decline in Heinz's ROE over the preceding four years (illustrated in Exhibit 1).
Significantly, this is the same kind of risk that our growth value is exposed to in as much as that value is based on assumed perpetual returns of 69% (note [c] in Exhibit 6). Frankly, this is not the kind of assumption frequently attributable to one of the world's foremost value investors. However, the Heinz franchise is a compelling one, and as such the question in this case now becomes whether Heinz can be acquired in a manner that mitigates the deal's risk.
MANAGING VALUE REALIZATION RISK
Contracts are composed of terms and conditions, and many acquirers generally do not give terms and conditions the attention they deserve. A contemporary example of this is the Credit Support Annexes (i.e., collateral requirements) to various credit default swaps that AIG contracted to, and which contributed to their failure during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 23, 24 Such an example is relevant here because some value investors seem to excel in identifying investments with terms and conditions-enhanced margins of safety.
The Heinz acquisition is, in some ways, an example of this. To understand how, first consider that Mr. Buffett negotiated a 9% dividend for the $8 billion preferred stock portion of his investment in Heinz, which generates annual dividends of $720 million. As Mr. Buffett's total Heinz investment was $12 billion, this yield equates to a 6% annual return on investment, which on a relative basis is more than three times the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield.
25,26 Furthermore, Mr. Buffett negotiated warrants to acquire an additional 5% of the partnership's common stock for seemingly next to nothing. As he observed in Berkshire Hathaway's 2012 shareholder letter: "The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company's common stock for a nominal sum" (p. 4; italics added).
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In sum, in exchange for providing financing, Mr. Buffett was effectively given warrants on 5% of the common. The margin of safety on something for nothing can, obviously, be very large. To understand how large, consider the warrants that Mr. Buffett negotiated as part of his distressed investment in Goldman Sachs during the recent financial crisis. In that investment, he bought $5 billion worth of Goldman preferred stock and received $5 billion in warrants to buy $5 billion worth of common stock over the next five years. According to one recent analysis, the profit on this portion of the investment equates to $1.35 billion which, when converted to stock, will yield 1.31% and make Mr. Buffett one of Goldman Sachs's top 10 investors. 28 Incredibly, Mr. Buffett has been offered deals like this for decades. For example, Lewis [1989] describes the white-knight investment he made in Salomon Brothers in 1987:
Investors around the world envied Warren Buffett, for he had it both ways. His security-known as a convertible preferred-bore an interest rate of 9 percent which was in itself a good return on his investment. But in addition, he could trade it in any time before 1996 for Salomon common stock at thirty-eight dollars a share. In other words, Buffett got a free play, over the next nine years, in the shares of Salomon. If Salomon Brothers continued to falter, Buffett would take his 9 percent interest and be content. If somehow Salomon Brothers recovered, Buffett could convert his bond into shares and make as much money as if he had stuck his neck out and bought [Salomon] stock in the first place…. Buffett was making only the safe bet that Salomon would not go bankrupt (p. 225).
Salomon Brothers, of course, almost did fail, as a consequence of a U.S. Treasury Bond scandal that occurred in the early 1990s. The consequences of the scandal were so dire that Mr. Buffett actually had to assume control of the firm in order to save it. 29 A lesson from this experience is that a seemingly "safe bet" can be heavily contingent upon operational management.
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With respect to Heinz, operations are the responsibility of Mr. Buffett's business partner, 3G.
Looking back on Heinz's past performance (e.g., Exhibit 1) one can be skeptical that such performance could be continued, let alone improved upon, by managers who were not associated with the company. Geromel [2013] While the above is impressive, aggressive performance improvement techniques are fairly well known and widely practiced. The difference here could be in the way 3G implements its craft. By way of background, Stephen Schwarzman, in a discussion at Grant's 2013 Spring Conference, observed that 3G tends to identify future operational candidates at a very young age in Brazil. They then carefully mentor these candidates and even sponsor them at top business schools around the world, which has resulted in a stable of highly motivated, focused, and loyal professionals who have delivered exceptional performance over time. 31 If so, this model could be powerfully brought to bear at Heinz from a value realization perspective.
As noted above, Heinz has historically grown via a product-focused strategy that shrewdly capitalized on both demand-and supply-side trends. 32 Exhibit 8 profiles this success in emerging markets over the most recent nine years. To grow such performance, 3G could identify and exploit synergies across its various businesses, and it could also use Heinz as a platform to acquire other food and beverage companies. Such a strategy is not without risk, as synergies have proven incredibly difficult to achieve over time.
33 However, if 3G is able to operationally achieve synergistic benefits while it profitably grows, then the Berkshire-3G partnership will be well placed to realize significant value over time given the market dynamics in which it is operating.
Those dynamics were profiled in Heinz's Winter 2012-2013 Investor Presentation, "Driving Profitable Growth," which forecasted that emerging markets will contain 6 of the world's 10 largest economies (ranked by GDP) by the year 2050: China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, and Indonesia.
34 If this forecast is proven cor-
E X H I B I T 8 Heinz Growth in Emerging Markets: Percentage of Total Company Sales from Emerging Markets
Data source : Heinz, "Driving Profitable Growth: Investor Presentation," Winter 2012 . Downloaded from company website, March 2013 rect, efficient execution of an emerging markets, synergy-based growth strategy could result in performance justifying this deal's premium-to-book value, thereby mitigating its value realization risk.
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CONCLUSION
Our valuation supports a $72.50 per share acquisition price for Heinz based on an estimated 68% growthbased margin of safety. However, it will not be easy to continue growing at Heinz's historical levels of profitability. To illustrate, consider the sensitivity analysis ref lected in Exhibit 9. This exhibit profiles the value of Heinz if its growth-based returns decline to 27.4% (which is 60% of the return on net asset value used in Exhibit 6, note [d] ) or if returns increase by 10%. It is relatively easy to accept a 27.4% return for a mature firm like Heinz and to be highly skeptical of 60% plus returns.
That said, Mr. Buffett has experience realizing abnormal levels of profitability in strong franchises, the quintessential example of which is his 1995 acquisition of GEICO. In an earlier article for this journal, we commented on operational and managerial techniques that could have been used in GEICO to realize value (Calandro [2011a] , pp. 10-13). With Heinz, Mr. Buffett is relying on his business partner, 3G, to operationally realize value; therefore, time will tell if it will be able to do so, as GEICO's management has, or if it will stumble, as Salomon Brothers' and General Re's management did. Calandro [2009 and 2011a] .
E X H I B I T 9 Heinz Growth Value: Sensitivity Analysis
A P P E N D I X E X H I B I T A 1 Heinz's Risk-Adjusted Margin (RAM) Calculations
Note: Calculations are the author 's and have been rounded. For General Re's calcualtions, see Calandro [2009, pp. 96-99] .
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1
The price was $28 billion if Heinz's debt was included. 2 See Calandro [2009, Ch. 4 ] for more information on the General Re acquisition.
3 According to Goldberg and Wilcox [2011] , ketchup originated "in eastern Asia as a type of spiced fish sauce, the modern version of the tomato-based condiment was introduced in the United States in the early 19th century. By 1801, a recipe for tomato ketchup was printed in an American cookbook entitled The Sugar House Book. In 1824, a ketchup recipe appeared in The Virginia Housewife, an inf luential 19th century cookbook written by Mary Randolph, Thomas Jefferson's cousin."
4 For more information, see Koehn [2001] . 5 For information on Heinz's product pricing, see Goldberg and Wilcox [2011] and Wilcox [2009] . 6 For more information, see Johnson [2011] . 7 According to the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) website (http://www.theacsi.org/about-acsi/aboutacsi), "the ACSI is an independent national benchmark of customer satisfaction with the quality of products and services available to household consumers in the United States… . Each year, roughly 70,000 customers are surveyed about the products and services they use the most. The survey data serve as inputs to an econometric model that benchmarks customer satisfaction with more than 230 companies in 47 industries and 10 economic sectors, as well as over 100 services, programs, and websites of federal government agencies."
8 As Warren Buffett has pithily and accurately stated, the goal of valuation is "to be approximately right rather than precisely wrong" (Buffet [1993] 
